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CASE NOTES
In Bell v. Nye,14 it was shown that a grantee had constructive notice,
for the purpose of denying equitable estoppel, if the conflicts as to where
the title was to be situated were present in a recorded deed. As applied
to the Cook case, the grantees would be deemed to have constructive
knowledge of all the provisions in the first deed to the grantor's brother.
Therefore, they would not be allowed to rely on the grantor's misrepre-
sentations and would be precluded from applying the doctrine of equit-
able estoppel.
However, constructive notice is effective to deny one's right to the
use of equitable estoppel only where the conduct creating the misrepre-
sentations is mere silence. If any affirmative act or statement creates the reli-
ance, equitable estoppel cannot be nullified by constructive notice. 15
The grantor in Cook was an active participant in the transactions affecting
his interest and made several oral statements and overt acts to create the
reliance on his misrepresentations. Equitable estoppel was not, therefore,
nullified since constructive notice had no effect because the affirmative
acts lead to the representations and the reliance thereon.
The lot when first conveyed out was free of any restrictions since
reciprocal negative easements do not ordinarily apply retroactively. The
defendant, in the position of a subsequent purchaser, could therefore use
the land in any manner. However, the defendant had by his representa-
tions, induced the purchasers of other lots to buy, thinking that all the land
was restricted. These representations on his part gave rise to an equitable
estoppel which precluded him from asserting that the restrictions do not
apply to his lot and thus, we find in effect, a reciprocal negative easement
applied retroactively.
14 Ibid.
15 Bean v. Harris, 93 Okla. 10, 219 Pac. 300 (1923); Robbins v. Moore, 129 111. 30, 21
N.E. 934 (1899); Morris v. Herndon, 113 N.C. 236, 18 S.E. 203 (1893).
TORTS-DEFENSE OF ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE HELD
AVAILABLE TO OFFICERS OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH BELOW DEPARTMENT HEAD LEVEL
Petitioner Howard, a United State Navy Captain, was sued for alleg-
edly false and libelous statements. The respondents were officers of the
Employees Association recognized by the Navy in its Boston Naval
Yard. The libelous communique was sent by Howard to various members
of the Department of the Navy and to the Massachusetts congressional
body. Subsequently, the libelous statements appeared in the papers. On
summary judgment, the district court held for petitioner; on appeal the
court of appeals remanded the case, asserting that Howard's claim of
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absolute privilege in communication to his superiors was in error. The
Supreme Court, on a writ of certiorari reversed and ruled that petitioner
had absolute privilege. Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959).
Matteo and Madigan, employees of the Office of Housing Expeditor,
had proposed a plan to make terminal-leave payments out of 1950 funds
appropriated for that purpose rather than out of general funds the follow-
ing year if the life of the agency was extended by Congress. The plan
provided that agency employees would be discharged, given their termi-
nal-leave payment, rehired immediately as temporary employees and
restored to permanent status should the life of the agency be extended,
as it subsequently was. Barr, general manager of the agency, expressed
his opposition to the Expeditor who declined to adopt the plan generally,
but gave permission for its own use on a voluntary basis to a small num-
ber of employees, including respondents. Later, the Office of Rent Stabili-
zation which replaced the Expeditor Office, received an inquiry from
Senator Williams regarding those payments. Madigan drafted a reply and
sent the same to petitioner. Barr's secretary thereupon signed the response
without Barr's knowledge of the entire transaction. The reply produced
strong criticism on the Senate floor which was widely reported in the
press. Barr, as acting director of the Rent Office, notified Matteo and
Madigan of their dismissal and issued a statement to the press explaining
his action. On this publication respondents received a favorable verdict.
It was affirmed by the court of appeals; petitioner, before the Supreme
Court, claiming to have qualified privilege, abandoned his previous defense
of absolute privilege. The case was remanded to the court of appeals
which, in turn remanded the case to the district court, stating that peti-
tioner's claim of qualified privilege was a valid defense, but that the
evidence showed facts which might defeat this defense. On a writ of
certiorari, Barr re-asserted his claim of absolute privilege. The Supreme
Court now ruled that Barr's original defense of absolute privilege be
granted. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
At first glance, the facts in the above-described cases seem to be identi-
cal. Both petitioners were government employees; both were sued for
libel in a communication issued by them; both claimed absolute privilege
as a defense and both were ruled to be entitled to this privilege. One
glaring deviation is apparent. Howard's libel, although published in the
newspapers, ensued from a communication to his superior officers in the
line of his official duties. Barr's libel involved a direct press release with
no transmission to a superior involved.
Absolute privilege is a specie of immunities guaranteed to officers in
the agencies of the government. This privilege as regards the executive
branch is the concern of this paper and, therefore, it is essential to
understand the origin of its creation. By constitutional interpretation and
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by common law rule, legislative and judicial immunities, respectively,
were permitted during the exercise of legislative or judicial duties.' Un-
like absolute privilege, these immunities were not restricted to libelous
acts, but applied to any breach, felonious or tortious, while in the per-
formance of one's duties.
In Spalding v. Vilas,2 the Supreme Court extended judicial immunities
to encompass cabinet heads in the executive department also. Nearly all
subsequent decisions concerning executive immunities involved the issu-
ance of libelous statements. Hence, absolute privilege and immunity were
used interchangeably, but it must be remembered that absolute privilege
is only one form of immunity.
This immunity is designed to protect an officer from civil suits and
damages for alleged libel while in the performance of his duties.3 How-
ever, from the decisions in the Howard and Barr cases, it is readily ap-
parent that expansion of this doctrine has occurred since the Spalding deci-
sion. This development affected the use of absolute privilege in a dual
manner. It affected the type of personnel protected by the immunity and
also defined the class of communications to which the doctrine of absolute
privilege could apply.
It should be noted that immunities for governmental officials were
created by the need to effect an efficient government. The creation of
executive immunity was no exception.
[T]he same general considerations of public policy and convenience which
demand for judges of courts of superior jurisdiction immunity from civil suits
for damages arising from acts done by them in the course of performance of
their judicial functions, apply to a large extent to official communications made
by heads of Executive Departments when engaged in the discharge of duties
imposed upon them by law.4
The basis for all following cases regarding absolute privilege for the
executive department stems from this statement. In the Spalding case,
suit was brought against Vilas, the Postmaster General, for the allegedly
malicious circulation among postmasters of information concerning plain-
tiff which he knew to be false. The decision, in effect, allowed a cabinet
member absolute privilege in the internal communications issued by him
in performance of his duties.
In DeArnaztd v. Ainsworth,5 defendant, as Commissioner of Pensions,
1 U.S. Const. Art. 1, S 6; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 WNall. (U.S.) 335 (1871).
2161 U.S. 483 (1896).
3 Ibid.; cf. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (C.A.2d, 1949).
4 Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896).
524 App. D.C. 167 (C.A.D.C., 1904), app. denied 199 U.S. 616 (1905). Accord: Farr
v. Valentine, 38 App.D.C. 413 (C.A.D.C., 1912).
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refused to believe plaintiff's claim of being a war hero and therefore
deserving of the Congressional Medal of Honor. Defendant notified the
proper congressional subcommittee effecting publication of plaintiff's re-
quest and subsequent refusal. In a libel suit, judgment was for defendant.
Communication, as in the Spalding case, was internal but it was com-
municated by an inferior officer to a superior officer. The converse was
true in the Spalding case. Hence, the Ainsworth case, in effect, broadened
the privilege to include officers, other than department heads. It based
this extension on the agency theory stating:
[Ilt is impossible for a single individual to perform in person all the various
duties assigned to the particular department of which he is head. [He must]
perform the larger portion of such duties through the agencies of the heads of
bureaus and divisions of his department.6
Ainsworth also broadened the limit as to disclosure, by allowing full
privilege in the performance of one's entire duties and protected an
officer from civil suit even though his communication was in error or
released by mistake.7
Subsequent decisions were based on the precedents established in De
Arnaud. The courts, however, remained in doubt as to exactly which offi-
cers in the executive department were allowed absolute privilege. In Miles v.
McGrath,s the District Court of Maryland settled this issue by stating:
"It is not for the court to determine the relative importance of the execu-
tive arm that is brought into the controversy; but merely to apply the
principle [from the DeArnaud case]." All federal courts subsequently
followed this concept. From Smith v. O'Brien,10 one can perceive the
effect the Miles decision brought to the court's thinking. In the Smith case,
plaintiff, a retired government employee, was unsuccessful in securing an
annuity. Consequently, Smith asked the Tariff Commission for assistance.
Upon recital of the facts which plaintiff hoped would secure the annuity,
defendant accused Smith of embezzlement. The court of appeals reasoned
that defendant's statement was encompassed in his duties and, therefore, ab-
solutely privileged. As long as the defendant's actions were within the scope
of his duties, the courts would extend absolute immunity for such action
without the need of inquiring into the importance of his responsibilities.
6 DeArnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App. D.C. 167, 180 (C.A.D.C., 1904).
7 United States v. Brunswick, 69 F.2d 383 (C.A.D.C., 1934); Brown v. Rudolph, 25
F.2d 540 (C.A.D.C., 1928).
8 4 F. Supp. 603 (Md., 1933).
9 Ibid., at 606.
10 88 F.2d 769 (C.A.D.C., 1937); cf. Newbury v. Love, 242 F.2d 372 (C.A.D.C., 1957);
Lang v. Wood, 92 F.2d 211 (C.A.D.C., 1937).
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In Brewer v. Mellon," the court did not touch upon the personnel
affected by absolute privilege, but concerned itself with and extended the
use of communications covered by this immunity. Brewer, as an investi-
gator of the United States, allegedly claimed and reported to Congress of
certain discrepancies shown in the Treasury Department. Mellon, as head
of the Treasury, dispatched a letter to the President defending himself and
his department from Brewer's assertions. The letter also contained libelous
statements regarding Brewer's character. Mellon released an identical copy
of the communique to the press. 2 In Ainsworth, a similar press publication
occurred, but the court overlooked this aspect and concentrated on the
fore-mentioned personnel expansion thesis. The Mellon court relied on that
decision for precedent and repeated from the case:
Public policy affords absolute protection and immunity for what may be
said or written by an officer in his official report or communication to a super-
ior, when such report or communication is made in the course and discharge
of official duty.13
The Court interpreted from the foregoing that public policy would war-
rant publication in the press of any official communication. The Mellon case
thus resulted in absolutely privileged press releases if an official communica-
tion was at the foundation for such a release.
As the Ainsworth case expanded the use of absolute privilege affecting
personnel, the Glass v. Ickes'4 decision enlarged the immunity in applica-
tion to the communications involved. In the Glass case, defendant, as
Secretary of the Interior, issued a direct statement to the press regarding
Glass' activities as an oil lobbyist and his prior employment with the
government. In effect, the release cautioned all oil interests that plaintiff
was of unsound character. Unlike the Mellon case, the press release re-
sulted from no communication to a superior officer. The source came
directly from a cabinet head's office, but the appellate court ruled the
statement to be absolutely privileged. No other communication was
needed and if public policy warranted, such information could be directly
issued to the public in way of explanation or discussion. As long as the
release was "more or less [in] connection with the general matters com-
mitted by law to his control or supervision,"'I5 it would be absolutely
privileged.
11 18 F.2d 168 (C.A.D.C., 1927), app. denied 275 U.S. 530 (1927).
12 Many asserted that the communication was just a device to maliciously libel
Brewer, but the court said this was immaterial.
13 DeArnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App. D.C. 167, 178 (C.A.D.C., 1904).
14 117 F.2d 273 (C.A.D.C., 1940).
15 Ibid., at 278.
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In Colpoys v. Gates,16 the same appellate court clarified its position as
to just what parties would be allowed this extended immunity. The
court held:
[In] the cases which have extended an absolute privilege to administrative
officers without policy-determining functions, the thing held to be privileged
has usually if not always been an act in the general line of duty, not a
separate discussion or explanation.17
The court therefore limited this privilege to policy determining officials.
This, in effect, meant cabinet heads only were to enjoy such immunity.
The subject matter of the libel suit in Colpoys was a statement made by
a United States Marshal concerning two of his deputies whom he had
previously dismissed. The court conceded that Colpoy's duty included
dismissal of employees, but felt that Colpoy's duty in no way allowed
him to explain such actions to the public. To the court, it was obvious
that the marshal was no policy maker and therefore not allowed an im-
munity for his direct press release.
From an analysis of the expansion of absolute privilege, it is apparent
that the Howard case directly followed the doctrine as established in the
Ainsworth and Mellon decisions. Howard's behavior was identical to
that in these two cases. The communication was transmitted to a superior
official and as a consequence, published in a daily journal. The Matteo
case, on the other hand, presents a growth in absolute privilege. Not only
are cabinet heads now allowed the privilege originated in the Glass case,
but agency and bureau heads as well. Whether the Court considers a
department head as a policy maker or not is an unanswered question.
Thus, this rule of absolute privilege may be considered as an extension
of the doctrine itself or it can be treated as an expansion of those now
considered as policy makers. From either interpretation, however, it is
obvious that absolute privilege is now larger in its application.
Although the perimeter of absolute privilege assumes a never ending
process of growth, a strong minority is manifesting itself. The initial
dissent appeared in the Glass case and has extended to both the Howard
and Matteo decisions. Furthermore, the Colpoy case must now be con-
sidered as a minority ruling. The basic ground for the dissents is the
conflicting interest of rights presented by such an immunity. The indi-
vidual's freedom from defamation of character opposes the interest of
public policy in an efficient proper functioning government. As its basis,
the majority of the courts hold to the original Spalding decision that
an official can not be:
16 118 F.2d 16 (C.A.D.C., 1941). This case was decided six months after the Glass
opinion.
17 Ibid., at 17.
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[U]nder an apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct
may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for damages.
It would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public
affairs ... if he were subjected to any such restraint. His conduct [therefore]
cannot be made the foundation of a suit ... even if the circumstances show
that . . . his action injuriously affects the claims of particular individuals.' 8
Although in harmony with the majority, the minority jurists feel that
the expansion of absolute privilege is becoming too extreme in that its
original basis is being exploited to destroy this basic individual freedom.
To the dissenters, the granting of such a privilege removes a check on
irresponsible action and makes vindication in open court of those defamed
impossible. This disquieting thought was best summarized by Justice
Groner in the Glass decision. In his dissent, he feared:
[T]hat in . . . previous cases [the court] may have extended the rule be-
yond the reasons out of which it grew and thus unwittingly created a privilege
so extensive as to be almost unlimited and altogether subversive of the funda-
mental principle that no man in this country is so high that he is above the
law.19
The question remains, however, as to whether expansion of absolute
privilege will continue. The Matteo and Howard decisions which were
5-4 and 6-3 decisions, respectively, would imply that the balance be-
tween the two interests is shifting. The inference is present that the
doctrine of absolute privilege has reached its extensive limit and that
any attempt to enlarge upon it will meet with solid judicial objection.
18 Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896).
19 Glass v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 273, 282 (C.AD.C., 1940).
